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HARMONIZATION, PREFERENCES, AND THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT IN COMMERCIAL AND OTHER LAW
SAUL LEVMORE*

1.

Introduction

All harmonization is not equal. When it comes to child labour, for example,
members of an economic or political union, and even their external critics and
competitors, generally agree that constituent States should harmonize their
laws. Mere trading partners agree to harmonize their copyright laws. There is
less agreement about securities law, and much less about other subjects of
domestic regulation, including school curricula, State-supported religions,
health care delivery, tort law, subsidy and taxation of the arts, and approval
processes for pharmaceuticals. For these subjects, we find variety with respect
to policies, statutory frameworks, rules, and enforcement even within unified
legal systems. Across jurisdictions, only some of these laws seem to converge
over time, though there is more harmonization within an economic union than
among simple trading partners. One wonders whether the variety illuminates
the optimal level of harmonization with respect to commercial law in the
European Union.
For the most part, harmonization opportunities come at the expense of
variety, in the form of respecting local preferences, or political outcomes.
There are many potential gains from harmonization, but proponents of
harmonization with respect to commercial law across the European Union are
likely to stress the potential reduction in transaction costs.1 Sceptics are likely
* William B. Graham Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law School.
1. Gomez and Ganuza, “An economic analysis of harmonization regimes: Full
harmonization, minimum harmonization or optional instrument?”, 7 European Review of
Contract Law (ERCL) (2011), 281. (“With social welfare in mind, it is very likely that the
largest advantage of building and establishing harmonized legal standards of behaviour for
contracting parties, in Europe as in other areas of the world, would be essentially to reduce the
transaction costs in cross-border commercial activity, and thus to enlarge economic welfare
arising from those increased economic interactions that cross the national borders.”). For
projected reductions in transaction costs through the adoption of CESL, see Commission Staff
Working Paper: Impact Assessment on a Common European Sales Law, Ref, Ares
(2011)893702-19/08/2011, p. 12; and “A European contract law for consumers and businesses:
Publication of the results of the feasibility study carried out by the expert group on European
contract law for stakeholders and legal practitioners feedback”, p. 4, available online at
<ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/feasibility_study_final.pdf>. For arguments that CESL
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to be anxious about the process of choosing the focal points around which to
harmonize and then also to favour the ongoing competition among
jurisdictions that harmonization suppresses. One form of compromise is not to
harmonize but to offer an attractive alternative that might appeal to
jurisdictions, or even to businesses and individuals, which can then opt in to
this alternative set of legal rules – though it must be apparent that Member
States could simply harmonize around one of the many existing commercial
codes. The alternative might be limited to, or more attractive for, cross-border
transactions. The Draft Common European Sales Law (CESL)2 fits this
description, even as it incorporates many mandatory terms. It offers an
opportunity to think specifically and generally about harmonization.
Section 2 begins quite generally with the relationship between local
preferences and harmonization. Section 3 takes a brief detour to include the
role of harmonization in promoting union-wide identity. Section 4 takes
account of local preferences, and the role of the median voter, in order to
understand what might be harmonized. Section 5 introduces the inefficient
moves a majority might make because of its ability to impose “external costs.”
These inefficiencies can illuminate the winners and losers from
harmonization. Section 6 builds to a conclusion about the winners and losers
from harmonization by developing the notion of an organized subgroup with
similar preferences, and contrasting harmonization with spontaneous
convergence.
2.

Preferences as a source of harmonization or variety

It is instructive to begin with an example where harmonization is
uncontroversial, as it reflects widely shared moral sentiments. There is such
widespread agreement in the developed world with respect to child labour, for
instance; local preferences are not celebrated, and harmonization is
will fail to reduce transaction costs, see Pachl, The Common European Sales Law – Have the
Right Choices Been Made? A Consumer Policy Perspective, Maastricht European Private Law
Institute Working Paper No. 2012/6 (2012) (arguing that the European Commission and other
groups exaggerate the potential reduction of transaction costs through adopting CESL); and
Posner, The Questionable Basis of the Common European Sales Law: The Role of an Optional
Instrument in Jurisdictional Competition, Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper No.
597 (2d Series) (2012) (arguing that the introduction of CESL as optional will likely increase
transaction costs in cross-border exchanges because – among other reasons – parties will
continue to invest in understanding the variety of national laws in addition to CESL in order to
pick the most advantageous law for any exchange).
2. Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common
European Sales Law, Brussels, 11 Oct. 2011, COM(2011)635 final.
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appealing.3 Harmonization might also be the product of cross-border moral
outrage, followed by political and economic pressure, with respect to such
issues as income inequality, genetically modified crops, consumption of horse
meat, and immodest fashions, though these pressures are more difficult to
develop as the moral component weakens or appears more culture-bound.
With the possible exception of consumer protection, most of commercial law
creates yet less excitement in foreign jurisdictions, so that it is likely that this
explanation of harmonization has little bearing on our subject, except to
remind us that it can come from preferences about other people’s well-being.
A second explanation is that one’s own moral sensibilities with respect to
the behaviour of others are heightened when competitive advantage is in the
air.4 If a jurisdiction prefers nicer parks, and raises taxes to finance these
parks,5 it recognizes that some businesses may migrate to other jurisdictions.
The parks do not serve the needs of the businesses, and residents must pay for
the parks they prefer. In contrast, if a jurisdiction shelters the homeless, its
citizens are apt to think that it is wrong for businesses to be able to move away
and escape their share of this cost. The superior shelters represent an unselfish
expenditure, or so it will be thought, and, if mobility is easy, there may be a
race to the bottom in which no one can afford to help the homeless even though
some prefer to do so in the first instance. If we combine the two explanations
we can say that the objection to local preferences, and the moral case for
harmonization, arises either where human rights are concerned or where
mobile taxpayers are perceived as evading a responsibility and driving
jurisdictions to a lowest common denominator where other-regarding
preferences are at issue.
The domestic regulation of child labour or genetically modified crops
might raise the cost of doing business, and this will encourage some
businesses to expand or migrate to unregulated jurisdictions. Domestic
interests will regard this as a race to the bottom. A jurisdiction might combat
some part of this unpleasant competition by regulating consumption rather
3. Although there is disagreement over the degree to which local preferences for child
labour should be tolerated, I refer here to official positions articulated by the governments of
developed nations. For a discussion of these issues, see Myers, The Right Rights? Child Labour
in a Globalizing World, (2001) Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, 575.
4. See e.g. ibid. (“One answer [to the issue of diverging tolerance for child labour] is that
since one country’s acquiescence to lower labour standards gives it trading advantages in
labour-intensive goods, there should be multilateral sanctions against such a country; and social
clauses should be used to deter such ‘illegitimate advantages.’”) (citations omitted).
5. I recognize that a jurisdiction has no preferences, but rather that the people within it do so.
The discussion refers to a jurisdiction’s sentiments as shorthand for its median voter, its
politicians, its intensely concerned and organized constituents, or its constituents’ aggregated
welfare, as the context requires.
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than production. Its law might simply forbid the consumption of goods made
in the manner it deems offensive or it might tax such goods to compensate for
the advantage that the “inferior” regulatory system bestows on its producers.
A mixed approach could bar domestic production and then ban offending
imports. But this strategy suffers from high enforcement costs. The offended
jurisdiction requires a good deal of information about production in other
countries; in contrast, most domestic regulation succeeds by monitoring a
very few manufacturing sites or accepting complaints from whistleblowers, of
which there will be many when a popular cause is at issue. Moreover, even
when foreign violations can be identified, one must have the ability to block or
tax imports. It is not just that international trade agreements may stand in the
way, but also that goods can be channelled through third countries or simply
sold in other countries while non-offending goods are directed to the
jurisdiction with the highest standards.
These initial examples will seem rather remote from most of commercial
law, with regard to which the rhetoric is likely to be about transaction costs
rather than morality.6 Still, preference protection may be more important than
transaction costs in terms of motivating harmonization.7 The gambit is also
somewhat misleading, because most strategies for satisfying preferences lead
to respect for disparate practices, or variety in law or markets, if only to satisfy
dissimilar predilections across jurisdictions. Most preferences can be satisfied

6. Harmonization in commercial law is unlikely to be justified on the basis of externalities,
though it might be advanced with the claim that non-harmonized rules encourage some leakage
and thus devalue a country’s unilateral laws. The claim seems weak for commercial law.
Similarly, the usual fear of unfair competition from unregulated jurisdictions seems much more
robust where preferences are concerned, as discussed in the text, than for commercial law. A
claim regarding an economy of scale seems plausible but nothing stops a jurisdiction from
allowing its commercial laws to converge with others. Harmonized laws might be a step towards
political unification, which brings its own scale economies, but this seems minor in the case of
the EU. These features of harmonization reflect the useful and insightful framework, as well as
scepticism, advanced in Leebron, “Claims for harmonization: A theoretical framework”, 27
Canadian Business Law Journal (1996), 63–107. A respectable case could be made for the idea
that local preferences have so little to do with commercial law (consumer protection aside), that
the game must be entirely about principal-agent problems or other reasons why jurisdictions
resist the “obvious” gains from harmonization. Carbonara and Parisi, “The paradox of legal
harmonization”, 367 Public Choice (2007). The authors adopt this starting point, and then
proceed with the interesting idea that local resistance might be a strategy to get others to absorb
the “switching costs”. In other words, harmonization offers benefits, and the trick is to incur as
little of the costs as possible. To the extent that this is the case, the discussion here adds fuel to
the wrong fire.
7. Gomez and Ganuza, op. cit. supra note 1, sets out clearly the choice between transaction
costs saving and local (country level) preferences, along with references to the ongoing debate
regarding EU commercial law. The discussion below reflects some of the same thinking about
the likely compromises that are made when two or more jurisdictions harmonize their laws.
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without insisting that other jurisdictions’ practices advance the same
preferences as one’s own.
An easy example of this sort of variety concerns public support for the arts.
A citizen might feel strongly that her government should support ballet
companies, rather than have those entities rely entirely on patrons, but it is rare
to see political capital expended in order to encourage a foreign jurisdiction to
support that art form. Few people object to diversity in arts spending, though
they do not go so far as to appreciate the economist’s Tieboutian perspective,
that they might relocate and sort themselves into jurisdictions that offer the
bundle of taxes and goods they prefer. Sorting at this level is academic.
Moving is costly and even prohibitive for many residents; governments are
unable to promise the continued provision of particular goods;8 and there are
too many goods alongside too few jurisdictions that will accept migrants. A
modest amount of sorting is the best we can expect.
3.

Harmonization and a “preference” for shared identity

Why then does a central government ever support something regarding which
there are diverse preferences? First, there may be an interest group, or even a
majority, that is well enough organized to defeat local interest groups. The
interest group that wants to spread its desire for ballet may find it cheaper to
push for central support than to influence ten local governments. Other
interest groups can, of course, compete, and when the dust settles it will be
impossible for us to judge whether interest-group activity helped reveal
intense preferences and achieve a desirable result or, instead, encouraged
wasteful rent-seeking or imposed external costs (a topic discussed in Section
5 below) and did not maximize social welfare. Similarly, we might intuit that
some interest groups prefer the harmonization of commercial law and others
do not, but we are enfeebled when it comes to expressing normative
judgements about the results of such battles.
The second, more far-reaching reason for central support is that authorities,
or elites, might see such a policy as a useful means of promoting group
identity. Thus, the Chinese Government based in Beijing supported and
pressed Mandarin on the provinces, even though we might guess that local
preferences were overwhelmingly inclined to maintain local dialects and not

8. There are exceptions. Investment in durable goods, and even capital goods like schools,
helps. Famously, the development of an industry with tax revenue implications, like the
corporate law industry in Delaware, helps commit to a pattern of laws over the long term.
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to bear the switching costs.9 Mandarin became mandatory for some things,
and it was to be the language of the future if only because it was imposed on
primary schools everywhere,10 but we can think of it as an “opt-in” choice for
many enterprises. Note that most of economic theory conveniently assumes
that preferences are given, and the usual paradigm leaves no room for
something like “developing a national identity,” or otherwise investing in the
development of new preferences. A central agency in control of arts funding
might be expected to favour touring performers, works that draw on common
historical experiences or myths, and other projects that promote a shared
national identity. In the case of the European Union, elites may also favour
projects and laws that promote a European identity, but they know to minimize
coercion. Indeed, the centrally-planned commercial law now ascendant in the
EU is full of choice at the enterprise rather than jurisdictional level, and this
may be the best tool of national unity that is politically acceptable.
The fact that one interest group promotes harmonization in furtherance of a
shared identity does not mean that other groups cannot join in the project but
have different motives. Large commercial enterprises might favour the
harmonization of commercial law either because of the potential for reducing
transaction costs in their far-flung transactions or because they perceive a
competitive advantage over modestly sized firms that are comfortable with
local laws.11 An interesting possibility is that risk averse businesses might
prefer variety because different laws favour different business strategies or
(even) products. A business will more likely find a market in which to flourish
if there are a variety of markets offering different legal environments, one of
which may be distinctly advantageous to that business. Just as a given business
9. See Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese
Language (Order of the President No.37) (31 Oct. 2000), available online at <english.gov.
cn/laws/2005-09/19/content_64906.htm> (stating as its purpose, the “normalization and
standardization of the standard spoken and written Chinese language and its sound
development, making it play a better role in public activities, and promoting economic and
cultural exchange among all the Chinese nationalities and regions”).
10. Ibid. at Ch. II, Art. 10.
11. On the other hand, some small businesses may also favour CESL because it would
enable them to make sales throughout Europe without having to pay for legal counsel to
navigate each country’s commercial law. See Hesselink, “The case for a common European
sales law in an age of rising nationalism”, 8 ERCL (2012), 342–366; see also “A European
contract law for consumers and businesses: Publication of the results of the feasibility study
carried out by the expert group on European contract law for stakeholders and legal
practitioners feedback”, cited supra note 1; but see Kornet, The Common European Sales Law
and the CISG – Complicating or Simplifying the Legal Environment? Maastricht European
Private Law Institute Working Paper No. 2012/4 (2012), p. 3–4 (arguing that the introduction of
CESL may increase legal complexity because it adds another option to the variants of sales law
available to businesses, which have already privately developed shared standards to harmonize
business practice).
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might like free trade, because it opens new markets even as it brings in
competitors to the market it already inhabits, so it might like different
environments, and thus non-harmonized laws, in these markets.12 This may be
a modest factor compared to the cost of switching (for some businesses) and
the cost of interfacing and dealing with several legal systems (for others), but
these latter factors are already appreciated as part of the case for and against
harmonization. European Union bureaucrats will prefer harmonization for
very different reasons, and not only the evolution of a shared identity,
including the fact they are likely to be the source of mandatory and other rules.
But it bears repeating that wherever harmonization is found, it has the capacity
to promote a shared identity.13
4.

Sorting versus median voters

The most significant cost of harmonization is the sacrifice of the welfare gains
obtained when mobile citizens sort themselves in a non-harmonized,
differentiated world. But sorting is not the only way to accommodate disparate
preferences. When a decision is made in a constituent jurisdiction it will
reflect the political process found there. If we simplify by setting authoritarian
governments, powerful bureaucrats, interest groups, and even intense
preferences aside, we can proceed with the approximation, or ideal, that a
jurisdiction’s political decisions reflect the preferences of its median voter.14
Thus, even if citizens are immobile, differentiation will improve welfare so
long as the varied preferences of residents across different jurisdictions are
reflected in disparate laws and policies. Legal systems are in this way like
firms in a market, and variety provides benefits. We should expect (even)
similar jurisdictions to have disparate traffic laws, arts subsidies, criminal
laws, farm policies, school curricula, and environmental laws alongside their
different cuisines and fashions. With respect to some of these topics, there are
right answers, as opposed to mere preferences, and we might expect various
processes to lead to convergence on those answers, or best practices. At the
same time, many right answers depend at least in part on preferences. Any two
populations are likely to have people with different preferences, and it is
12. Hesselink, ibid., 350 (noting that one of the common economic arguments against
adoption of CESL is that “competition between legal systems is better than harmonization”).
13. Ibid., 353–366 (arguing that resistance to CESL is partly motivated out of nationalistic
sentiment and that adoption of CESL would increase a sense of European identity without
necessarily sacrificing one’s sense of national identity). For some scepticism regarding the
power of contract law to promote European identity, see Posner, op. cit. supra note 1.
14. See Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (Harper & Brothers, 1957); Black, The
Theory of Committees and Elections (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1957).
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unlikely that two jurisdictions will have median voters with identical
preferences on many issues. In all the areas just listed, there is only a modest
inclination (or preference) for imposing preferences on other jurisdictions,
and there is a benefit in not having foreign preferences imposed on oneself. In
one example (traffic laws) there are modest transaction costs to be saved
through harmonization and in another (environmental law) there are
externalities to be dealt with, but in none of these cases would the argument for
harmonization be made as strongly as it is with respect to commercial law.
When two jurisdictions harmonize their (traffic, environmental, or
commercial) laws, it is likely that they compromise between the domestic
compromises they have already made. We can conveniently imagine that the
median voters in the two jurisdictions must meet and agree on a midpoint, or
perhaps the “combined” jurisdiction reaches a result that reflects its median
voter. As the number of jurisdictions increases, it is theoretically possible to
imagine that the losers, which is to say those whose preferences are distant
from the median voter’s, in many jurisdictions could locate one another and
benefit from central decision making by overcoming their respective median
voters at that level.15 Without direct elections for the centralized authorities,
however, this is most unlikely.
To be sure, laws are not only about preferences. Many questions of law have
right answers or codify best practices, as opposed to median preferences –
unless the correct characterization is simply that the median voter prefers the
best practice. For example, the speed limit on comparable bridges might be
identical in different jurisdictions. But most laws will reflect a mix of superior
policies and preferences. Thus, there is no single best set of criminal penalties,
because preferences come into play where questions of experimentation,
rehabilitation, and expenditures on improving prison conditions are
concerned. To be sure, the median voter in a jurisdiction might also have a
preference about the desirability of harmonization, and mixed into this
preference calculation will be that voter’s own projections regarding
transaction costs and experimentation, so we might expect some amount of
harmonization, or simply convergence, rather than diversity, for this reason
alone. It follows that if two jurisdictions have similar populations (in terms of
15. In other words, each country in the EU can be thought of as a jurisdiction in which the
median voter prevails. When these countries combine and make a centralized decision it is
barely possible that the result is not a compromise among the 27 median voters, or a majority of
those idealized positions, but rather an aggregation of the losers in many countries who find
enough like-minded partners at the federation level. This is, of course, vastly more likely in a
federation like the United States where these non-median voters can combine to elect a
president, or even more so in a federation with frequent plebiscites. A federation dominated and
managed by elected representatives of constituent States seems far more likely to reflect an
aggregation of the median voters in some of those States.
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preferences), their respective median voters might not be so far apart in terms
of their inclinations. In turn, when transaction costs associated with trade,
enforcement, and other matters are added in, preferences regarding the
content of laws might indeed converge across these jurisdictions. Even if we
could set simply imitation aside, we would expect the laws of two countries in
Western Europe to be more similar than a pair drawn from two distant
continents
Prior to enriching the analysis with the concept of external costs, it may be
useful to pause and placate the reader who is impatient with this circuitous
approach to harmonization of (EU) commercial law, both because commercial
law seems especially removed from mere preferences and because the CESL
is structured as optional – especially where business-to-business transactions
are concerned, and even more so because the choice is at the enterprise rather
than jurisdictional level. Even readers who are inclined to agree that a
theoretical approach, situating one harmonization question within others, can
be profitable, are likely to object that most of commercial law not only reflects
right answers regarding transactional efficiency but also deals rather directly
with trade among jurisdictions and, therefore, transaction costs more than
preferences. The median voter surely wants these costs reduced, the argument
goes, and has perhaps been thwarted by local interest groups, including
lawyers who invested in learning local codes and who enjoy something of a
monopoly if these disparate codes are retained. The benefits from
harmonization – as well as the explanation for stasis – might be analogized to
those at stake where the metric and imperial measurement systems are
concerned.
There are a few responses to this objection. One is that commercial law,
especially when mandatory, brings on more conflicts among interest groups,
perhaps because some rules impose costs on parties that do not expect to
engage in much cross-jurisdiction trade. A better response is that commercial
law is not unmoored from voters’ preferences. To begin with, there is the
question of consumer protection, where protecting careless or unsophisticated
shoppers comes at a cost to all, and thus implicates preferences regarding
wealth distribution, paternalism, and the like. It is unsurprising that this piece
of European harmonization receives the most attention.16 A second, less
significant trigger of preferences is the inevitable suppression of local history,
language, and culture implicated in all harmonization. A population that
16. There are principal-agent problems affecting voters and their representatives and also
between legislators and “their” regulators. Consumer protection law is likely the area within
commercial law where these are most significant, and thus the role of harmonization is there
most significant. Singer, “Capital rules: The domestic politics of international regulatory
harmonization”, (2004) International Organization, 531–565, thinks of harmonization as a tool
for satisfying domestic political pressures rather than the regulators own preferences.
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values tradition will gain utility from commercial (or any) law that can be
traced back to the rules used by its forebears.17 There is no reason to expect
this taste to be similar across populations, especially because some nations
prefer to distance themselves from their geographic or genetic ancestors,
while others cling to them. Finally, and most significantly, many elements of
commercial law mix preferences with right answers. Priorities in bankruptcy,
for example, might pit the claims of employees against those of the debtor’s
tort victims, and various preferences and values will generate an inclination to
favour one group over the other. Even the details of a secured transactions
regime will bring into play relative tolerance for forcible repossessions and
garnished wages, while others will reflect judgements about how much risk
consumers should bear in return for lower prices.18
5.

The calculus of consent and optimal legal areas

The more we think of law as reflecting the preferences of the median voter, the
more we need to ask why something is decided by law rather than left to
markets (or families or other institutions) in the first place. In median voter
terms, we can begin by noting the tyranny of the median voter, and then move
to the question of why we cannot increase welfare by creating many more
lucky median voters – by making jurisdictions smaller and smaller, much as
markets segment to serve a variety of consumer tastes. In the extreme case, if
each individual opts in to his own consumer law or commercial law, then
everyone’s preferences can be satisfied. Note that a jurisdiction can be large
for one purpose, such as national defence or currency, and much smaller for
another, as is true in some places for public schools and traffic management,
and could be true for commercial law. Indeed, the optimal jurisdiction size for
17. The role played by culture in creating friction (or non-compliance) for harmonization is
discussed in Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp and Leiber, Complying with Europe: EU Harmonization
and Soft Law in the Member States (Cambridge, 2005).
18. Secured Transactions is a good topic with which to contemplate the pressure to
harmonize even where the harmonized element begins in optional form. As firms elect the
CESL for cross-border transactions, it is likely that countries, not to mention the authorities in
Brussels, will try to make the law mandatory. Even if this is not the case, as some firms elect the
law because it is attractive to them, other firms will find that parties resist transacting unless
they too agree to opt in to the CESL. Consider by way of analogy the fact that credit cards have
spread, though their use is optional at the enterprise level. Firms need not accept them, and
consumers need not carry them, but as they become ubiquitous one is at a serious disadvantage
without them. Universality does not prove desirability, and does not eliminate the costs imposed
on the minority that was dragged in to the system. Another, more provocative, example is found
in the evolution of smoking regulation, which has evolved from opt-in to mandates in many
jurisdictions.
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one question of commercial law may well be different from that appropriate
for another. The thought experiment reminds us that each jurisdiction has
already harmonized, or unified, laws covering those who live within its
borders. There is no reason to think that it will maximize welfare by
maximizing coercion through unification. The problem with too much
individual choice, of course, is that scale brings advantages, most notably a
reduction in various transaction costs. In area after area of law, individuals
would trade away some autonomy in return for lower prices, coordination
gains, and so forth. If we allow every individual to make his or her own laws,
there will be substantial interaction costs and fewer exchanges. Among other
things, this trade-off pushes large swaths of law into one package when it
comes to the size of the jurisdiction in which it will prevail.
As the title of this Article (and Section) suggests, the framework is also
meant to remind us to incorporate Buchanan and Tullock’s notion that a
majority can be expected to impose “external costs.”19 Inasmuch as I intend to
contrast commercial law with other government actions, it is useful to dwell
on the external costs problem, which is in some tension with the median voter
perspective. The analysis is first framed in terms of individuals within a
jurisdiction, but it is the same for numerous jurisdictions within a union. There
is a median voter at both levels, and at both levels there is the problem or
temptation of external-cost imposition.
Consider three different cases. In the first, a simple majority votes to build
a new road at the expense of all taxpayers. Buchanan and Tullock develop the
idea that the majority might make an inefficient choice as to where to locate
the road or whether to construct it at all because 49 percent of the cost of the
road is borne by the minority. The majority can build a road the minority would
oppose, perhaps simply by locating it where it is useful to the majority alone.
If the decision makers enjoy 100 percent of the benefits but pay only 51
percent of the costs, they are likely to overbuild. The smaller the share of costs
paid by the majority, the greater the inefficiency problem. In the second case,
the assumption about uniform taxation is relaxed, so that the majority can draft
not only the road plan but also the tax law, enabling it to burden the minority
and not itself. The inefficiency problem is yet greater in this second case; the
majority can gain all of the benefits and pay none of the costs. If it can
externalize costs in this manner, it will build roads it barely wants, though
these are costly to others. It goes without saying that the example is
oversimplified; among other things, it ignores the ability of the minority to
turn this into a “mere” wealth transfer problem, by paying the majority not to
build the road.
19. Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional
Democracy (University of Michigan Press, 1962).
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In a third version of the external cost problem, the majority is constrained
and able to force expenditures by simple majority vote only with respect to
pure public goods. Things like roads are paid for with user fees, or by taxes that
are unanimously approved, or they are not built at all. Still, public goods are
not identically valued by all participants, and the majority might order an
inefficiently high level of a public good because the majority values it more
than the minority, though not enough to pay for it by itself. The problem of
external costs is solved only if majorities are unstable, so that a minority with
respect to one spending programme is in the majority in the next go around,
and there is a possibility of open or subtle bargains so that all majorities refrain
from imposing external costs. There is little evidence supporting such an
optimistic resolution.
It is plausible that the external cost problem is greater in smaller
jurisdictions than in larger ones. Two voters can impose external costs on one,
and a small number of players is likely to be better at maintaining a stable
majority, and exploiting the minority in repeat fashion, than is a large number.
A smaller jurisdiction is also likely to have homogenous voters who will form
a majority and be confident that they will have similar preferences across
many issues. Workers living near a factory or farmers who grow the same crop
in a suitable valley come to mind. On the other hand, in many cases it is easier
for an exploited minority to exit from a smaller jurisdiction without severing
employment and familial ties.
Fortunately, the external cost problem is largely limited to cases where
expenditures are concerned, and does not extend to all law. A good deal of
imagination and many assumptions are required before the most severe
external cost problem can be brought about by government regulation rather
than spending. By way of illustration, product liability law may be voted in by
a majority and imposed on a minority, but the costs are spread across most
purchasers and the presumed benefits will flow to some subset of these
purchasers, and then some other parties as well. The match between burdens
and benefits is imperfect, so there is room for the majority to externalize some
costs, but the problem is modest compared to what is possible when a majority
contemplates an excise tax to fund a new bridge. Other regulatory law is more
suspect on these grounds. For example, environmental regulations may
benefit the majority, while it imposes clean-up costs on a completely different,
minority, group. With such a mismatch, the majority, or even a well-organized
interest group, might easily pass inefficient regulations.
Readers will have disparate intuitions about where commercial law fits in
this scheme, and that may depend on the level of coercion in an initial,
harmonized code. Most of commercial law is surely more like product liability
and less like environmental regulation; it is certainly not like bridge building
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with an excise tax on an unrelated good or activity. It is tempting to say that
commercial law resembles none of these because much of it allows parties to
contract out; in the case of the CESL the default is reversed and enterprises opt
in rather than out. Where opting out is the rule, contracts may be costly, and for
many parties and transactions the default position is all that matters. Even
when there is no formal coercion, as others opt in one suffers costs by not
doing so. In any event, there is reason to think if a code like the CESL has
relevance, it will quickly take the opt-out form or even be imposed by the
majority on certain transactions; it is hard to resist the benefits associated with
imposing external costs and competitive disadvantages on others. If so, then it
is noteworthy that there are many areas of commercial law where courts are
hostile to contractual provisions, like liquidated damages, that attempt to
contract out of default terms provided by law.20 In other areas, like credit
transactions, it is difficult to contract out because of third-party effects. It is,
for example, difficult to contract around payment systems or the priority rules
of most secured transactions regimes.
Law may rarely be a pure public good, but it is difficult to exclude those who
wish to make use of it. Its benefits cannot normally be restricted to 60 percent
of the population while the other 40 percent pays for it. It could be structured
as more of a private good. One can imagine charging litigants for the use of
courts and collecting substantial user fees from debtors for such things as the
law of secured transactions. The typical legal system, however, charges
modest fees for these benefits and provides a publicly supported system, albeit
one that produces precedents, trade, and other positive externalities. Thus,
legal institutions, though they may arise out of a desire to impose preferences
through harmonization, are likely to reflect the first type of majoritarian
advantage, with its attendant external costs. The majority will impose more
law than is efficient, and certainly more than it would pay for on its own,
because it can share costs with those who will not benefit. The situation in
which the external costs problem is greatest, as illustrated by the case where
the majority can build roads it alone enjoys while it succeeds in taxing the
minority to pay the entire cost, is very hard to reproduce where law-making,
rather than spending, is involved. The most important sorting, but also the
greatest danger from sorting, is unlikely to apply where harmonization of
enabling or regulatory law (as opposed to taxing and spending) is at issue.
This is hardly the place to generalize about optimal legal areas, for that is a
matter complicated by the question of the gains and losses from harmonizing
some things but not others. I have already noted that the optimal size is likely
to be different with respect to every question, and this may be so even within
commercial law. One might want a large jurisdiction for defence, a small one
20. See Uniform Commercial Code, para 2–718(1).
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for consumer law, a bit larger for secured transactions, a different size still for
road building, and so forth. But it is clear that these various optima make the
question of effective political representation extremely difficult, and the
relative power of interest groups even harder to assess.
6.

Conclusion: Convergence and compacts

The United States hardly needed harmonized commercial law to promote a
sense of national identity, and yet its commercial law is fairly well
harmonized, both where merchant-to-merchant transactions are concerned
and, increasingly, where consumer law is at issue. There is no obvious
evidence of significant cost externalization in this commercial law system. In
the American experience we find another clue about harmonization; it came
about largely through convergence. By convergence I mean, first, that
different jurisdictions converged on the same legal rule, without any authority
pushing them to do so.21 In the most interesting cases, convergence evolves
across legal systems, without borrowing and even without knowledge of the
other legal system. In the United States there has been some coerced
harmonization (because of federal law regulating some consumer law,
securities law, and so forth) but also convergence by State legislatures and
courts, though hardly without awareness of other jurisdictions. Most
significantly, model codes, such as the Uniform Commercial Code, have been
drafted, and States have been free to adopt these codes, often with minor local
adjustments. A clever political or psychological aspect to these opt-in codes, is
that States do not feel as if another State was triumphant.22 The “winner” is a
code usually drafted by non-political actors, influenced greatly by organized
interest groups but normally incorporating a drafting committee eager to draft
the best possible law. These interests keep an eye on the politics of adoption by
State legislatures but it would be a mistake to minimize their desire to find the
best answers. Second, there is convergence at the enterprise level. For
example, one insurance company develops a form, and then because its terms
are litigated, it becomes advantageous for other firms to use the same form,
and it eventually becomes standard. One landlord or printing company draws
a lease, and then others copy it, perhaps because drafting one’s own lease
signals potential bargaining partners that one is strategic. Convergence as to
terms also makes price comparisons more straightforward. Convergence thus
21. Levmore, “Variety and uniformity in the treatment of the good-faith purchaser”, 16
Journal of Legal Studies (1987), 43–65.
22. In other words, everyone bears switching costs. See Carbonara and Parisi, op. cit. supra
note 4.
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occurs even, or especially, where – as in the world of the CESL –
harmonization is completely optional.
A good argument for EU harmonization with respect to commercial law is
that harmonization in the United States, and certainly in China, is further
along than in the EU, and those countries do not appear to be suffering as a
result. It is safe and perhaps wise to imitate one’s competitors. There is no
evidence that American States or Chinese provinces try to diverge or to
separate from harmonized commercial law. Smaller units do try to serve as
experimental zones, and Hong Kong might be thought of as an example of
diversity rather than harmonization, but inasmuch as most observers would
say that it represents a step toward a harmonized result, I will not dwell on that
exception. In any event, harmonization in the United States came not from
central directives but from convergence. Nothing has stopped the Members of
the EU from converging on one law. It might be said that in many cases
members of the United States converge with respect to commercial law and
many other kinds of law because they know that if they do not, there is a good
chance that federal law will develop and will pre-empt State law, with no room
for dissent or even minor variations. Convergence and soft harmonization is
thus often in the shadow of the threat of strong harmonization – though there
is no evidence for this in the case of business-to-business commercial law.
Whatever the extent of this effect, it seems impossible to say whether welfare
is maximized under current U.S. law. Local variation may reflect local
preferences and may increase welfare, or it may reflect overachieving interest
groups and may be unfortunate in its imposition of transaction costs. Nor is
there much to learn from the relationship between local variation and national
identity in the United States.
Imagine that fifteen of twenty-seven jurisdictions in a federation are
relatively homogeneous in the sense that the majority coalition in each of these
jurisdictions sees that its preferences are sufficiently similar to those of the
majority coalition (or median voter) in the other fourteen jurisdictions that it
would prefer to abide by the laws of its like-minded partners than it would to
the (unknown) decisions of the future majority of the twenty-seven.
Alternatively, some members of the fifteen have intense preferences about
some matters, and the group of fifteen is like-minded on these matters. The
case is ripe for the imposition of external costs. Imagine further that there are
restrictions on expenditures or taxes, perhaps because members of the
federation sought to protect themselves from the external costs problem. The
subset of fifteen can, therefore, manoeuvre only with regulatory law. In such
cases, the fifteen would be better off agreeing to agree in the future.23 This
power of a pre-committed caucus, or subgroup, is familiar to students of
23. See Levmore, “Precommitment politics”, 82 Virginia Law Review (1996), 567.
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political parties. In the American constitutional system it is combated by a rule
requiring congressional approval of State compacts; several States cannot
simply form a binding alliance. But it is clear that if a coalition of members, or
elected representatives, could oblige themselves to vote alike in the future,
they would gain at the benefit of their disorganized allies. The reasoning
behind this counterintuitive claim begins with the assumption or requirement
that each voter (each jurisdiction in the compacting group, or each senator in
the set of senators contemplating such a pact) expects more often than not to
agree with the majority of the group. We began, after all, with the assumption
that a subset had similar preferences. If so, it is beneficial to agree to vote with
the majority of one’s subgroup on all matters, as the agreement leverages
one’s own vote a majority of the time. A second step, or corollary, is that the
compacting group will then prefer for more matters to be decided centrally
rather than be left to local preferences and votes, because each member of the
compacting group has more power than the non-members where central
decision making is concerned. The analogy for a federation, or for the EU in
particular, is that a like-minded subset will prefer for more things to be
decided by directive, or in some other centralized manner. Federations have a
way of combating this compacting, or subgroup, problem. They can hope to
enforce a plain ban on subgroup precommitments to vote together in the
future. Alternatively, they can require various matters to be decided by
supermajority.
Note, however, that the federation should not be expected to combat the
power of the organized subgroup by opposing harmonization. Harmonization
can be expected to increase the influence of the central bureaucracy, though
the details of harmonization are likely to reflect the preferences of the
overachieving, organized subgroup.
It seems plain that a self-identified minority, not empowered by
“membership” in a like-minded subgroup, should generally resist
harmonization. In the context of the European Union this means that a
jurisdiction that thinks it is more likely to be exploited than it is to exploit
others should oppose harmonization with respect to something like
commercial law. Nothing stops it from allowing its laws to converge on the
majority’s, much as its citizens might over time dress in the fashions prevalent
in other countries, without committing to do so through any law. Fashions at
home and abroad can change, and it would seem strange to agree in advance to
abide by conventions set by others in return for very modest gains in trade.
In contrast, jurisdictions (like individual voters or representatives) that see
themselves as part of a stable, continuing majority with similar preferences
should normally prefer more central decision making, including
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harmonization.24 There is the danger that the ability to externalize costs will
generate inefficient laws, as might the advantage of a kind of compact that
dominates disorganized States, but that is of no concern to the majority. If the
primary consequence of harmonization, whether intended or not, is the
development of a single political and cultural identity, then there is the
question of whose identity and values will dominate, and the most likely result
is that harmonization will favour the stable majority. Perhaps those who most
favour strong harmonization in the case of EU commercial law are those who
expect to win this battle regarding European identity.

24. Multinational firms may benefit from harmonization because it reduces transactions
costs, but I hazard no conjecture on the question of political influence. Some large firms might
do better dividing and conquering at the local level, while others might be perceived as gaining
power when they need only influence central decision making.

